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FUNDAMENTALS OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION
IN STRAIGHT BANKRUPTCY OVER CONTROVERSIES
BETWEEN TRUSTEES AND THIRD PERSONS
Jerrold L. Strasheim*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is open to the Congress under its constitutional authority' to
create separate bankruptcy courts.2 Instead of doing so, Congress-
has directed United States district courts to serve as bankruptcy
courts on a part time basis.3
It also is within the congressional prerogative to confer upon
the chosen bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over all con-
troversies arising under the Bankruptcy Act.4 But that jurisdiction
has been fractionated with some reserved to bankruptcy courts and
the balance distributed to two kinds of nonbankruptcy courts,
namely United States district courts sitting as ordinary federal
courts and state courts.5
Jurisdiction may be classified as either plenary or summary.
Summary jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate controversies in
summary proceedings.6 Plenary jurisdiction is comparable judicial
power to adjudicate in plenary proceedings, 7 i.e., an ordinary suit
at law or in equity in which the trustee or receiver in bankruptcy
happens to be a party.
* B.S. in Law, University of Nebraska; Bachelor of Law cum laude,
University of Nebraska 1957. Order of the Coif; formerly Minority
Counsel, United States Senate Subcommittee on Improvements of
Judicial Machinery; member Nebraska Bar Association, American
Bar Association, National Conference of Referees in Bankruptcy. Pres-
ently, Referee in Bankruptcy, United States Court for District of Ne-
braska, Lecturer at Creighton University Law School.
1 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4: "The Congress shall have the power ...
to establish ... uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies through-
out the United States."
2 Bondurant, The Bankruptcy Court as a Constitutional Court, 45 Am.
BA~m. L. J. 235, 236 (1971).
3 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTECE § 0.60(8-6), at 651 (3d ed. 1966); Bank-
ruptcy Act § 1(10), 11 U.S.C. § 1(10) (1970).
4 Mussman & Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & CoN-
TEMp. PROB. 88, 89 (1948); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264
U.S. 426 (1924).
5 D. CowAxs, BANKRUPTCy LAW mm PRACTcE § 834 (1963).
6 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTCc § 38.30 (3) (3d ed. 1966).
7 Id. at § 38.30(4).
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Bankruptcy courts exercise plenary jurisdiction in a few in-
stances, but practically all of their cases involve summary jurisdic-
tion.8 Nonbankruptcy courts exercise plenary jurisdiction.
This article deals with the bankruptcy court's summary juris-
diction in straight bankruptcy over controversies between receivers
or trustees, hereinafter called simply trustees, and third persons.
It does not deal with summary jurisdiction in reorganizations,
arrangements or other rehabilitative proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.9 It also does not deal with summary jurisdiction over
other kinds of controversies in straight bankruptcy, most notably
those between the bankrupt and his creditors concerning his general
discharge or the dischargeability of his particular debts.10
As a coalescence of procedure and jurisdiction, summary juris-
diction has several perplexing aspects, the more significant of which
hopefully are identified and simplified below.
II. SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
Whether jurisdiction is summary or plenary determines the
"mode of procedure for trying out" the controversy." Summary
proceedings, those employed in the internal workings of the bank-
ruptcy courts, constitute one of the two alternatives; plenary pro-
ceedings, or in other words those used in separate civil suits, consti-
tute the other.
The Bankruptcy Act and General Orders contain but few rules
of procedure with general applicability for all summary proceed-
ings. Instead, they offer a few rules for parts of selected summary
8 The Bankruptcy Act, §§ 23b, 60b, 67e, and 70e(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 46b,
96b, 107e, and 110e (1970), read literally, provides that plenary suits
to recover preferences and fraudulently conveyed property are heard
by the bankruptcy court, although some argue the language is a legis-
lative oversight and those cases are heard by the district court as an
ordinary federal court, or in other words, by a nonbankruptcy court.
Involuntary bankruptcies amount to plenary suits or at least are diffi-
cult to classify as summary proceedings. See also Williams v. Austrian,
331 U.S. 642 (1947) [bankruptcy court (reorganization) hearing a
plenary suit].
9 The principles of summary jurisdiction in straight bankruptcy are en-
larged upon to an uncertain extent by considerations @f title in re-
organizations, arrangements, and the like by reason of express statu-
tory provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and
his property wherever located. Bankruptcy Act §§ 77(a), 111, 311,
411, 611, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(a), 511, 711, 811, 1011 (1970).
10 Id. §§ 2a(12), 14, 17, 38(4), 11 U.S.C. §§ Ila(11), 32, 35, 66(4) (1970).
11 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 326 (1966).
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proceedings12 and sanction queasy, on-again off-again application
of some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the balance. 13
In some jurisdictions local rules of court may regulate phases of
procedure in summary proceedings.
But in the main, summary procedings have always been more a
matter of practice than a set of legislated or promulgated rules.
Their hallmark is flexibility; they are designed to promote dispatch
and economy by shaping rules on an ad hoc basis within the pattern
of procedures for plenary proceedings, but avoiding the excessive,
drawn-out proceduralisms sometimes incident to plenary proceed-
ings.
Summary proceeding like plenary proceedings must meet con-
stitutional requirements of procedural due process.14 This means
that overall they must be fair and regular "according to ... rules
and principles which have been established in our systems of juris-
prudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights ..... ,, 5
and that litigants are entitled to receive due notice of the proceeding
and the subject thereof and to be accorded a reasonable opportunity
to be heard.16
A jury is not available in summary proceedings, 7 and the referee
invariably presides, although a district judge may do so.' 8
Aside from the absence of a jury and the presence of the referee,
the differences between summary proceedings and nonjury plenary
proceedings all arise before trial. In other words, it is in the issue-
framing and original process stages that summary proceedings are
liberated from the many hard and fast nonconstitutional rules that
govern plenary proceedings.
In current practice, summary proceedings are instituted by ap-
plication or motion rather than by complaint or petition as are
plenary proceedings; the original process is an order to show cause
12 E.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 14, 58b, 11 U.S.C. §§ 32, 94b (1970).
's Id. § 21k, 11 U.S.C. § 44k (1970).
14 In re Wood & Henderson, 210 U.S. 246 (1908); Bradley v. St. Louis
Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1951).
'5 Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
16 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
'7 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); In re Christensen, 101 F. 243
(D.C. Iowa 1900); 5 J. MooRs, FEDERAL PRACTicE § 38.30(2) (3d ed.
1966).
Is Bankruptcy Act § 1(9), 11 U.S.C. § 1(9) (1970), defines the term
"court" to mean either the referee or the judge. In practice the former
hears all straight bankruptcy cases.
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or a notice of motion served less formally than a summons issued
by either federal or state courts; responsive pleadings are required
to be filed only when the court directs instead of automatically
within fixed times as in plenary proceedings; and since the time of
trial is fixed at the outset in the order to show cause, discovery and
pretrial proceedings are less regularly employed than in plenary
proceedings. 9 Usually, in summary proceedings the trial is sooner
than in plenary proceedings, sometimes within a few days, the re-
quirement being only that there be reasonable time for prepara-
tion.20
Once the trial begins there is no difference between summary
proceedings and plenary proceedings. The same rules of evidence
apply in trials in summary proceedings as apply in trials in plenary
procedings in the federal courts:21 proposed Rules of Evidence for
the United States Courts and Magistrates may soon be applicable.2
The trial in summary proceedings is not akin to a hearing in a
plenary suit leading to a summary judgment, and the two should
not be confused. Controversies are not decided ex parte, and affi-
davits are no more admissible in evidence than they are in plenary
proceedings, although some courts who should know better keep
suggesting that this is so.23
In the future, what is now current practice is likely to be changed
as a result of the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Bankruptcy Rules.
Under these rules, summary proceedings dealing with almost all the
controversies between the trustees and third persons covered in this
paper are classified as adversary proceedings,2 4 and they are regu-
lated by rules which, at least in theory, combine the best in both
19 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.30 (3) (3d ed. 1966); see also Herzog,
Bankruptcy Law-Modern Trends, 40 REF. J. 19 (1966).
20 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.30 (3) (3d ed. 1966).
21 Id. See Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir.
1950).
22 PRoPosED FEDERAL RUL.ES or EvniENCE (Rev. Draft 1971), in 51 F.R.D.
315 (1971), made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings by Rules 101
and 1101.
23 Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 73
(1962); Herzog, supra note 19.
24 More important kinds of disputes fall into the classification of adver-
sary proceedings which are listed in Bankruptcy Rule 701, including
proceedings brought to recover money or property, determine lien
rights or sell free and clear of liens. But other kinds of disputes in-
cluding objection to claims, if no counterclaim is asserted, fall into
the classification of "contested matters." Treister, A Practicing Law-
yer's Primer on the Proposed New Bankruptcy Rules, 45 A . BANxR.
L. J. 343 (1971).
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summary proceedings and plenary proceedings, retaining much of
the flexibility of the former but incorporating many of the "tradi-
tional safeguards" which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bring
to the latter.25 Attorneys who do not specialize in bankruptcy are
bound to feel more comfortable in summary proceedings under the
Proposed Bankruptcy Rules than under the present rules.
The Proposed Bankruptcy Rules provide that adversary proceed-
ings are instituted by the filing of a complaint 26 and for a summons
as original process 27 although ordinarily service is by mail with re-
turn receipt.28 They require responsive pleadings within twenty days
or such different date indicated by the court in the summons.29 They
specify that a trial date also is to be included in the summons.30
Specific rules also deal with amendment of pleadings,31 third party
practice,3 2 pretrial procedures,33 joinder of claims and parties, 4 in-
terpleader,35 intervention,36 substitution of parties,3 7 and other pro-
cedural aspects of summary proceedings for which there are rules
in plenary proceedings.
Orders made by referees in summary proceedings become final
within ten days. 38 Where such an order is a money judgment en-
forcement is by writ of execution or by other process available for
enforcement of federal court money judgments in general. 9 Where
such an order is for equitable relief enforcement generally is by
resort to contempt powers.4 6 Appeal of a referee's order is to a
25 Id.
26 Rule 703.
27 Rule 704(a).
28 Rule 704(c).
29 Rule 712(a).
30 Rule 704(a); Form No. 26.
31 Rule 715.
32 Rule 714.
33 Rule 716.
84 Rules 718-721.
35 Rule 722.
36 Rule 724.
37 Rule 725.
38 Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67c (1970).
39 Governor Clinton Co. v. Knott, 120 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941), appeal
dismissed, 314 U.S. 701 (1941), holding FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a) applicable
to referee's order directing payment to trustee from other than an
identifiable fund.
40 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1947).
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district judge,4 1 and appeal from there is to a court of appeals.42
The Proposed Bankruptcy Rules also deal with the enforcement of
orders made by referees43 and review and appeal from those
orders.44
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Apart from its its procedural incidents, summary jurisdiction
is subject matter jurisdiction which empowers the bankruptcy
court to speak to particular classes of bankruptcy-spawned contro-
versies. Plenary jurisdiction in contradistinction to summary juris-
diction denotes the power to speak to the remaining classes of such
controversies.
The legislative standards supplied by Congress for separating
the controversies which are amenable to summary jurisdiction from
those to which plenary jurisdiction is necessary are found in the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, which, to some extent, duplicate
and supervene brief provisions in the Federal Judicial Code.45 In
many critical respects the provisions in the Bankruptcy Act amount
to terms of art which mean no more and no less than the courts
have said they mean.
The Act in section 2 confers summary jurisdiction over "pro-
ceedings," which, as detailed in numerous subsections, involve
among other things the allowance of claims4 and the collection of
the estate.47 It extends this summary jurisdiction to include any
"controversy arising in a proceeding under this Act .... "48 The Act
in section 2349 describes the subject of plenary jurisdiction as "con-
troversies at law and in equity . . . between trustees and adverse
claimants .... "Additional language in sections 2 and 23 deal with
the manner and effect of consent summary jurisdiction. Other sup-
plemental provisions in the Bankruptcy Act grant summary juris-
diction over specified controversies.
41 Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67c (1970).
42 FED. R. App. P. 4(a), 6, superseding as of July 1, 1968, Bankruptcy
Act § 25, 11 U.S.C. § 48 (1970).
43 Rules 769, 770.
44 Rules 801-814.
45 Not meaning what it says, the Code provides that: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
states, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy." 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(1964).
46 11 U.S.C. § lla(2) (1970).
47 Id. § lla(7).
48 Id.
49 Id. § 46.
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It follows that in litigation between trustees and third persons
involving more than objections to claims, the division between sum-
mary and plenary jurisdiction' depends upon the distinction between
that species of controversy "arising in a proceeding" and that species
of controversy "at law and in equity" save only in those few situ-
ations where the supplemental provisions in the Act may apply.
Guided by history, the courts have made this distinction depend
upon a concept of possession and, consistent with the statutory
language, a concept of consent. If the controversy is over property
which the bankruptcy court has in its possession, it arises "in a
proceeding" and summary jurisdiction exists. Absent possession, if
the third person consents, summary jurisdiction also exists. Other
controversies, except, of course, those dealt with in the supplemental
provisions of the Act, are "at law and in equity" for which plenary
is necessary. Thus, the trustee must invoke plenary jurisdiction
either where the controversy is over property in the possession of
the third person or where the controversy does not involve specific
property. at all, namely where it involves a mere chose in action
such as an account or a claim for damages for breach of contract.5 0
A. PossEssIoN
When the trustee proceeds in bankruptcy court against a third
person the most fundamental basis for summary jurisdiction is
possession. That basis exists without regard to the locus of title.
It is axiomatic that any court in possession of a fund is the re-
pository of judicial power to hear and determine all claims to that
fund. The jurisdiction of such a court is in rem or quasi in rem and
the fund is in custodia legis.51 It is on this theory that the bank-
ruptcy court is empowered to decide those contrbversies between
the trustee and others claming title to, an interest in, or a lien on
property in its possession.52 As will be discussed, the theory some-
times obtains even though the property is gone.
Insofar as the bankruptcy court has possession of property its
jurisdiction is exclusive. 3 Third persons may not proceed by self-
help or in nonbankruptcy courts to replevin the property,54 fore-
close liens on itl5 or sell it for taxes.5 6 This exclusive jurisdiction
50 Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934).
51 Mussman & Riesenfeld, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 88 (1948).
52 L. AcLAcIaN, BA RuPTcY § 109 (1956).
53 Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931).
54 White v. Scbloerb, 178 U.S. 542 (1900).
5 5 Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931).
56 Dayton v. Stanard, 241 U.S. 588 (1916).
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is not confined to property within the court's territory but reaches
property anywhere in the United States.
51
Reciprocation exists in the form of a rule of comity under which
bankruptcy courts cannot ordinarily acquire possession of property
already in the possession of a nonbankruptcy court when the peti-
tion in bankruptcy is filed.5 s According to the most widely accepted
view, the nonbankruptcy court acquires constructive possession as
soon as the prebankruptcy suit is instituted even though the debtor
has not been removed from physical possession. 59 According to other
views or in other contexts, the nonbankruptcy court may not acquire
possession until the appointment of a receiver with authority to take
physical control of the property60 or until he has achieved physical
control.6 '
It should be noted that even if the nonbankruptcy court ac-
quired possession before the bankruptcy petition was filed, the
bankruptcy court may enjoin proceedings in the nonbankruptcy
court to maintain the status quo for a sufficient time to enable the
trustee to investigate the litigant's claims to the property even
though eventually the nonbankruptcy court will adjudicate those
claims.62
When not barred by comity the bankruptcy courts may acquire
either actual or constructive possession. The court comes into actual
possession through the trustee or another of its officers reducing the
property to his physical control. It acquires constructive possession
through pure legal fiction whenever entitled to but not placed in
actual possession. It is entitled to actual possession of all property
in the bankrupt's possession at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. 3 It is also entitled to the actual possession of all of
the bankrupt's property held by third persons who do not qualify as
adverse claimants or their agents.6
57 Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254 (1913); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Tim-
ber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931).
-58 Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931).
-59 In re Greenlie-Halliday Co., 57 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1932).
•60 Frazier v. Southern Loan & Trust Co., 99 F. 707 (4th Cir. 1900);
5 H. REAINGTON, BANKMrMPTCY § 2050 (5th ed. 1950).
-61 Rutledge v. Bristol, 65 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1933); In re Canyon Pipe-
line Co., 89 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
62 In re Lustron Corp., 184 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 946 (1951).
63 Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 399 U.S. 478 (1940).
64 May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925).
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The actual possession of the bankruptcy court tacked directly to
that which the bankrupt had on the filing date of the petition in
bankruptcy is an unimpeachable basis for summary jurisdiction to
determine rights to the property. But actual possession is no basis
for summary jurisdiction when acquired wrongfully from a third
person. Thus, in Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co.65 it
was held that actual possession did not confer summary jurisdiction
to determine rights in goods stored in a field warehouse which the
trustee took without the right to do so from the the field warehouse
storing them as of the day the petition in bankruptcy was filed.
Actual possession may be the basis for summary jurisdiction to
determine rights to intangibles so long as the intangibles amount
to specific property and have been reduced to some form of control
comparable to physical control. In Chicago Board of Trade v. John-
son" the Court rejected the contention that a seat on a stock ex-
change was incapable of actual possession. It found possession
enough for summary jurisdiction in the trustee's right to control the
disposal of the seat. In Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Bloomberg67
actual possession was the basis of summary jurisdiction to determine
conflicting rights to a secret manufacturing process. That possession
was predicated on the control found to exist in the form of exclusive
knowledge of the process. Other authorities hold that actual posses-
sion of a chose in action may provide a basis for summary juris-
diction to determine whether the trustee or an assignee is the
proper obligee depending upon control.8 8 The trustee has the requi-
site control where under the terms of the assignment the assignee
was not entitled to give notice or collect from the obligors,69 but
not where the assignee was entitled to do those things.70 Of course,
if the trustee prevails against the assignee, he must then resort to
plenary jurisdiction to collect on the chose in action from the
obligor.71
Constructive possession suffices in place of actual possession as a
basis for summary jurisdiction to determine rights to the property. It
has already been pointed out that constructive possession is fictional
and is not based on physical control. Indeed, it is the negation of
physical control. Its effect is to conform the limits of summary
65 189 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1951).
6 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
87 298 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1962).
08 Schwartz v. Horowitz, 131 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1942).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 In re Roman, 23 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1928).
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jurisdiction with actual possession as it should exist instead of as
it does exist.
InTaubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox72 the Court said that con-
structive possession giving rise to summary jurisdiction:
[E]xists where the property was in the physical possession of the
debtor at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, but
was not delivered by him to the trustee; where the property was
delivered to the trustee, but was thereafter wrongfully withdrawn
from his custody; where the property is in the hands of the bank-
rupt's agent or bailee; where the property is held by some other
person who makes no claim to it; and where the property is held
by one who makes a claim, but the claim is colorable only.73
In the first two of those instances of constructive possession the
key is whether the bankrupt had actual possession when the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed. In that circumstance the rule stated most
notably in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.74 and repeated so
often elsewhere has relevance:
Bankruptcy courts have summary jurisdiction to adjudicate con-
troversies relating to property over which they have actual or con-
structive possession. And the test of this jurisdiction is not title in
but possession by the bankrupt at the time of the filing of the pe-
tition in bankruptcy.75
In re Livingston6 was a case of nondelivery. There the bank-
ruptcy court was held to have summary jurisdiction to determine
whether the trustee could invalidate the security interest in a
never-to-be-seen-again automobile which had been in the bank-
rupt's hands when the bankruptcy petition was ified but shortly
thereafter was repossessed through self-help and sold by the secured
party. An example of wrongful withdrawal is Whitney v. Wenman.77
There, a receiver took the actual possession of goods from the bank-
rupt who held them on the date the petition was fied but later
the receiver, without authority, surrendered them to a warehouse
company which sold them. It was held that summary jurisdiction
existed to determine whether the trustee could invalidate warehouse
receipts on the goods and that such summary jurisdiction had not
been lost by the receiver's unauthorized surrender of them to the
warehouse company.
72 264 U.S. 426 (1924).
73 Id. at 432-33.
74 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
75 Id. at 481.
76 93 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
77 198 U.S. 539 (1905).
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The first two of the remaining three instances of constructive
possession enumerated in Taubel are particular kinds of the third,
which is residual in nature. In all three the key is that the bank-
rupt had been dispossessed by the time the bankruptcy petition had
been filed. In that circumstance the rule is that the requisite con-
structive possession is present if, on the one hand, the claim is
merely colorable but not if, on the other, the claim is an adverse
claim.
The distinction between claims which are merely colorable and
those which are adverse ultimately depends on Harrison v. Chain-
berlin,78 in which the court stated:
[Ain actual claim may be adverse and substantial even though in
fact "fraudulent and voidable." ... And, on the other hand, a claim
is merely colorable if "on its face made in bad faith and without
legal justification."
[A]s to the test to be applied in determining whether an ad-
verse claim is substantial or merely colorable, we are of opinion
that it is to be deemed of a substantial character when the claim-
ant's contention "discloses a contested matter of right, involving
some fair doubt and reasonable room for controversy," . . . in
matters either of fact or law; and it is not to be held merely color-
able unless the preliminary inquiry shows that it is so unsub-
stantial and obviously insufficient, either in fact or law, as to be
plainly without color of merit, and a mere pretense.79
It follows from Harrison v. Chamberlin that a claim is not merely
colorable where it is necessary to weigh the force of opposing
credible evidence on a substantial and controverted issue of con-
trolling fact.80 This does not mean, however, that it is necessary
to swallow an incredible tale and "be ignorant as judges of what we
know as men."8' In In re Meiselman82 the point was made:
We do interpret these [Supreme Court] decisions as requiring the
holding that there is reasonable doubt from the claimant's own
testimony alone, when it is disbelieved by the referee.... A claim-
ant cannot avoid a summary order by the very audacity of his
claims of either fact or law. The referee must proceed to determine
whether the adverse claim is "plainly without color or merit and a
mere pretense" on a proper weighing of the testimony considered
78 271 U.S. 191 (1926).
79 Id. at 194-95.
80 Bostian v. Schapiro, 144 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1944), cited in Seligson
& King, supra note 23.
81 Sahn v. Pagano, 302 F.2d 629, 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 819 (1962) (quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Watts v. State of
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)).
82 105 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1939).
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in the light of the claimant's self-interest and a due consideration
of existing law.83
Illustrations of the instances of constructive possession described
in Taubel, where the bankrupt was dispossessed when the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed, should perhaps be offered. Mueller v.
Nugent84 is an agency case. There, before the bankruptcy petition
was filed, the bankrupt father had delivered over $14,000 to the
son who was keeping it for him. Babbitt v. Dutcher85 is a no-claim
case. There the trustee sought to recover records of the corporate
bankrupt from its officers who resisted on the ground that the
trustee was not entitled to them because they did not relate "to
the property of the bankrupt" but not on the ground that they
themselves were entitled to them. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper
Corp.8 6 is a general colorable-versus-adverse-claim case. There the
individual bankrupt had formed, controlled, and been in business
through the corporation which was claiming to have an adverse in-
terest in assets which once had belonged to the bankrupt. In all of
the foregoing cases the claims were found colorable and not adverse.
As often as not, the character of the claim is not clear and as
Judge Sanborn said in Teasdale v. Robinson,87 "what may appear
to one judge to be a bona fide substantial adverse claim may seem
to another to be merely colorable and a pretense."
B. CONSENT
Where the court does not have possession consent is an alterna-
tive basis for summary jurisdiction over controversies between
trustees and third persons.
In most courts jurisdiction over subject matter may not be con-
fererd by consent. In contrast, the Act in section 23b expressly pro-
vides that bankruptcy courts may acquire subject matter jurisdic-
tion on a consensual basis. Since MacDonald v. Plymouth County
Trust Co.88 it has been plain that subject matter jurisdiction so con-
ferred may be summary jurisdiction.
88 105 F.2d at p. 998, cited in Copenhaver, Summary Jurisdiction, 41
REF. J. 108 (1967).
84 184 U.S. 1 (1902).
85 216 U.S. 102 (1910).
86 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
87 290 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1961), cited in Seligson & King, supra note
23.
88 286 U.S. 263 (1910).
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Where predicated on consent, summary jurisdiction ordinarily8 9
is in personam and nonexclusive. Once consent is given it may not
be withdrawn.90 The consent may be express, as where the parties
have entered into a written stipulation authorizing the bankruptcy
court to decide the controversy.
But the consent also may be implied, and a body of case law
deals with the issue of when implied consent gives rise to summary
jurisdiction. That question usually arises in one or the other of two
settings.
In the first, consent to summary jurisdiction over the trustee's
claim against the third person is implied if at all from failure
of the latter to object to summary jurisdiction before proceeding on
the merits. As amended in 1952, the Act in section 2a (7) provides
that:
[w]here in a controversy arising in a proceeding under this Act an
adverse party does not interpose objection to the summary jurisdic-
tion of the court of bankruptcy, by answer or motion filed before
the expiration of the time prescribed by law or rule of court or
fixed or extended by order of court for the filing of an answer to
the petition, motion or other pleading to which he is adverse, he
shall be deemed to have consented to such jurisdiction.
This 1952 amendment to section 2a (7) is the congressional re-
sponse to Cline v. Kaplan.91 In that case, the trustee had petitioned
for an order requiring third persons to surrender specified property,
they had answered on the merits and then participated in extensive
hearings near the end of which the referee indicated his intention to
rule for the trustee. At that point an objection to summary jurisdic-
tion was made for the first time. The Supreme Court did not
discuss the effect of the answer on the merits, viewed the hearings
as dealing with the question of jurisdiction only, and announced at
the end of their opinion that "consent is not given even though
claimant 'participated in the proceedings' provided formal objection
to summary jurisdiction is made before entry of the final order."92
The major consequence of the 1952 amendment to section 2a (7) is
to conform the rules for objecting to summary jurisdiction with
those for objecting to jurisdiction over the person and for making
certain defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h). Now
89 Consent by voluntary surrender of property could give rise to other
than in personam jurisdiction.
90 2 Coamn oN BAmmurrcy § 23.08(1), at 534 (14th ed. 1971), and
cases cited therein.
91 323 U.S. 97 (1944).
92 Id. at 100.
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the third person impliedly consents to summary jurisdiction unless
he objects by motion before answer or in the answer itself. The bank-
ruptcy court is able to fix a point of no return from implied con-
sent by specifying the time for answering or otherwise responding
either by local rules of court or in individual orders to show cause.
Although there apparently are not many such local rules the ex-
panding practice is to include in orders to show cause requirements
for answers or other responses.93
A knotty problem raised by the 1952 amendment to section 2a (7)
is whether its swath goes beyond the kind of controversy in Cline v.
Kaplan which is usually associated with section 2, i.e., where the
trustee is attempting to recover specific property, and reaches the
kind of controversy usually associated with section 23, where the
trustee is attempting to recover on a chose in action. In some dis-
tricts the practice has developed for trustees to avail themselves of
summary jurisdiction to collect accounts receivable. Under this prac-
tice the trustee brings a summary proceeding against the obligor,
obtains an order requiring that the obligor answer or respond and
thereafter show cause why judgment should not be entered against
him. If the answer or response does not include an objection to sum-
mary jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court hears the matter on the
theory of implied consent.
In re J. S. Mobile Homes94 read the 1952 amendment literally to
give rise to implied consent where the trustee sought in personam
relief on a theory of "tortious conversion" and the respondent did
not object to summary jurisdiction until commencement of the hear-
ing. It should be compared with earlier decisions in In re Houston
Seed Co.,95 Inter-State National Bank of Kansas City v. Luther26
In re Pennington,9 7 and Continental Casualty Co. v. White9" which
have all viewed the 1952 amendment as applicable only to situations
where the trustee initiates the proceedings and not where the trus-
tee counterclaims to collect on a chose in action after a creditor fied
a proof of claim.
It is interesting to speculate what would have been the result
in J. S. Mobile Homes if there had been a default. In First National
93 See, e.g., Moller, Ex Parte Practice and Procedures on Contested
Matters, in PROCEEDINGS OF TmRD SEMINAR FOR REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY
100 (Clark Boardman ed. 1966).
94 434 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1970).
95 122 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Ala. 1954).
96 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1956).
97 339 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1965).
98 269 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1959).
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Bank v. Fox99 it was held that a default by an adverse claimant did
not amount to consent to summary jurisdiction.
In the second setting, consent to summary jurisdiction over a
trustee's counterclaim sometimes is regarded as implied from the
filing by a third person of a proof of claim for a pro rata share of the
estate, or a petition to reclaim or foreclose upon specific property,
or an application for other relief. It is possible that in this setting
reliance on implied consent is misplaced.
The pivotal case is Katchen v. Landy. 0
The Act in sections 2a (2) and (15) 101 confers broad powers upon
the bankruptcy court to pass on claims and make whatever orders
and judgments are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Further, section 57g'0 2 provides for the disallowance of claims as-
serted by creditors who have received but not surrendered "prefer-
ences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or encumbrances,
void or voidable under this Act" and section 68103 sanctions set-offs
between the trustee and third persons.
Before Katchen most courts agreed that bankruptcy courts had
summary jurisdiction over a counterclaim which the trustee asserted
defensively or as a set-off to the third person's proof of claim be-
cause of their express power to pass on claims and because of the
provisions relating to set-offs. If the trustee sought affirmative relief,
most courts agreed that summary jurisdiction existed over related
counterclaims, variously described as being those based on the sub-
ject matter as the claim, or those arising out of the same transaction,
or those qualifying as compulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 13 (a), but that summary jurisdiction did not
exist over unrelated counterclaims. The rationale was that the filing
of the proof of claim amounted to an implied consent within the
purview of section 23 to summary jurisdiction over related counter-
claims, but was not such a consent to jurisdiction over unrelated
counterclaims. A major consequence of the distinction was that sum-
mary jurisdiction did not exist over counterclaims the trustee was
likely to make, namely those for the recovery of unrelated prefer-
ences or fraudulent conveyances. Different views existed in different
99 111 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1940).
100 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
101 11 U.S.C. § lla(2), (15) (1970).
102 Id. § 93g.
103 Id. § 108.
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jurisdictions, but those summarized in this paragraph were middle-
of-the road.104
Pre-Katchen law tended to narrowly confine summary jurisdic-
tion over the counterclaims asserted by the trustee in response to
petitions seeking to reclaim or foreclose upon specific property or
other relief as distinguished from those in response to proofs of
claim. A leading case was Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co.10 5 where a
petition to reclaim bonds was met with a counterclaim for the re-
covery of money, and the Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy
court had summary jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights to the
bonds but not the rights to the money. The effect of this holding
was to deprive the bankruptcy court of summary jurisdiction over
unrelated counterclaims even for defensive purposes. Comparable
rules were applied in other situations, for example in the case of a
counterclaim to an application by the creditor for payment of ex-
pense of administration. 10 6
In Katchen an officer of the corporate bankrupt filed proofs of
claim for rent due and for reimbursement of payments he had made
on the bankrupt's obligations with his personal funds. The trustee
counterclaimed for the recovery of unrelated preferences and an
unpaid stock subscription. On review the district court sustained
summary jurisdiction over the counterclaim in its entirety. On ap-
peal the court of appeals sustained summary jurisdiction over the
part of the counterclaim for the recovery of unrelated preferences
but not the part for the recovery of the unpaid stock subscription.'0 7
104 The leading cases are: Gill v. Phillips, 337 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1964);
Nortex Trading Corp. v. Newfield, 311 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1962); Peters
v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1960); Continental Cas. Co. v. White,
269 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1959); In re Majestic Radio and Television Corp.,
227 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 995 (1956); Inter-
state Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dis-
missed, 350 U.S. 944 (1956); In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327 (3rd
Cir. 1952), cert denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953); B. F. Avery & Sons Co. v.
Davis, 192 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1951), cart denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952);
Columbia Foundry Co. v. Lochner, 179 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1950); Floro
Realty & Inv. Co. v. Steem Electric Corp., 128 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1942);
Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938); In re Nathan, 98 F.
Supp. 686 (S.D. Cal. 1951). For post-Katchen developments see In re
Vista Liner Coach & Trailer, Inc., 447 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1971); In re
Behring & Behring, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1971). See also, Rochelle
& King, Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy: Katchen v. Landy andQuestions Left Unanswered, 1966 DuKE L. J. 669; Seligson & King,
supra note 23.
105 285 U.S. 154 (1932).
106 Cherno v. Engine Air Service, Inc., 330 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1964).
107 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964).
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In the Supreme Court the only issue was whether the court of ap-
peals had correctly found summary jurisdiction over the counter-
claim for the recovery of the unrelated preferences. 08 The Court
answered that question affirmatively but did so without deciding
whether the filing of the proofs of claim amounted to an implied
consent under section 23b. The Court held that summary jurisdiction
existed because in order to pass on the claims the bankruptcy court
had to decide the issues underlying the counterclaim. The necessity
for doing so followed from section 57g which barred the allowance of
the claims in the event the claimant retained preferences. In view
of the necessity of the bankruptcy court passing on the preference
issue, "it can hardly be doubted that there is also summary juris-
diction" to grant the trustee affirmative relief. Thus, it was crucial
that the counterclaim was within the purview of section 57g. The
Court stated in a footnote:
[I]t is not necessary to ascertain whether the creditor has "con-
sented" to such determination within the means of § 23 (b). Rather,
our decision is governed by the "traditional bankruptcy law that
he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof
of claim and demanding its allowance must abide the consequences
of that procedure." . . .As this is the basis of our decision, we
obviously intimate no opinion concerning whether the referee has
summary jurisdiction to adjudicate a demand by the trustee for
affirmative relief, all of the substantial factual and legal bases for
which have not been disposed of in passing on objections to the
claim.10 9
And to amplify on its ruling the Court quoted Alexander v. Hillman,
an equity receivership case, which lower courts sometimes relied
on and sometimes distinguished in determining the scope of sum-
mary jurisdiction over counterclaims for affirmative relief. The
quote in Katchen from Hillman is as follows:
'By presenting their claims respondents subjected themselves
to all the consequences that attach to an appearance ....
"Respondents' contention means that, while invoking the court'sjurisdiction to establish their right to participate in the distribution,
they may deny its power to require them to account for what they
misappropriated. In behalf of creditors and stockholders, the re-
ceivers reasonably may insist that, before taking aught, respondents
may by the receivership court be required to make restitution. That
requirement is in harmony with the rule generally followed by
courts of equity that having jurisdiction of the parties to contro-
308 Unfortunately, the trustee did not seek to review the adverse decision
on the stock subscription.
109 382 U.S. at 333 n.9.
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versies brought before him, they will decide all matters in dispute
and decree complete relief."" 0
Whatever its effect on the rationale of implied consent, Katchen
probably will not bring about much change in lower court holdings
that summary jurisdiction exists to hear non-section 57g related
counterclaims to proofs of claim but not non-section 57g unrelated
counterclaims. Yet the reliance in Katchen on Hillman is trouble-
some, for in Hillman the counterclaims were based on torts and
were unrelated to the claims which were based on contracts. Also,
Katchen probably will not change the scope of summary jurisdiction
over the trustee's counterclaims asserted against petitions to reclaim
or foreclose upon specific property. Here again, the reliance in
Katchen on Hillman is troublesome for Hillman seems to make some
inroad into Daniel.
If implied consent continues to be the basis for summary juris-
diction over counterclaims, some additional points are noteworthy.
One already made earlier is that if the proof of claim proprio vigore
is not implied consent, the failure of the creditor to object when the
counterclaim is asserted probably cannot be raised as a different
form of implied consent on the theory that the 1952 amendment to
section 2a (7) requires such objection.:" Another is that failure to
object before the final order probably would amount to implied con-
sent.1 2 The last is that the creditor who files a proof of claim to
some extent may be able to avoid a summary jurisdiction over
counterclaims by appropriate language in the claim itself." 3 Doubt-
less, Katchen prevents such a reservation from being effective with
respect to counterclaims within section 57g, but the language may
well be effective with respect to counterclaims outside of section 57g.
It may be noted that implied consent to summary jurisdiction
may be found in any other setting where conduct of various kinds
amounts to submission of an issue or matter to the court's deter-
mination. An example of such conduct is a voluntary surrender of
property to the bankruptcy court." 4
C. SUPPLEMENTAL GRANTS
There are three supplemental grants of summary jurisdiction
110 382 U.S. at 335.
l See notes 95-98 supra.
112 In re Read-York, Inc., 152 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1945).
113 In re Eakin, 154 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1946); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Strom,
198 F. Supp. 450 (S.D. Cal. 1961); In re G. L. Odell Const. Co., 119
F. Supp. 578 (D. Colo. 1954).
114 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 23.08(2) (14th ed. 1971).
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in the Act worthy of mention in the text of this article; the others
are cited in the footnote." 5
Section 67a (4)116 specifically grants summary jurisdiction where
the trustee seeks to set aside liens obtained through judicial pro-
ceedings within four months before bankruptcy when the bankrupt
was insolvent. Section 70a (8) 17 expressly grants summary juris-
diction when the trustee brings an action to compel an assignee for
the benefit of creditors to turn over property to the bankruptcy
estate. Section 60d" 8 has been held to impliedly grant summary
jurisdiction over payments and promises to pay to attorneys in
contemplation of bankruptcy.
D. JURISDIcTIONAL HEARING
The bankruptcy court determines whether it has summary
jurisdiction or not. To that end, where the issue is raised the bank-
ruptcy court must hold a preliminary hearing to determine whether
some basis for summary jurisdiction exists.
Most often the preliminary hearing is crucial where constructive
possession is the only possible basis of summary jurisdiction and its
existence depends upon whether the claim of a third person in
actual possession is colorable or adverse. It is well settled that the
bankruptcy court in that situation makes the determination and
does not cease to function merely because the claimant asserts an
adverse claim. As the Court said in Harrison v. Chamberlin:
[Tjhe court is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the mere assertion
of an adverse claim; but, having the power in the first instance to
determine whether it has jurisdiction to proceed, the court may en-
ter upon a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the adverse
claim is real and substantial or merely colorable. And if found to
be merely colorable the court may then proceed to adjudicate the
merits summarily; but if found to be real and substantial it must
decline to determine the merits and dismiss the summary pro-
ceeding."9
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A source of continuing puzzlement is the reach of the bank-
ruptcy court's original process in the exercise of its summary
jurisdiction. Congress could make the bankruptcy court's service of
"5 11 U.S.C. §§ lla(21), 69b, 78n, 931, 107f(4), and 109b (1970).
116 Id. § 107a(4).
"7 Id. § l10a(8).
118 Id. § 96d.
119 271 U.S. at 194.
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process nationwide,'120 but for the most part it has declined to do so
in straight bankruptcy. It follows that the reach of the bankruptcy
court's original process may not correspond with the reach of its
subject matter jurisdiction.
There is little question but that the bankruptcy court's original
process is at least co-extensive with that of district courts as ordin-
ary federal courts. This is because General Order 37 makes appli-
cable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (f), which permits service of
original process "anywhere within the territorial limits of the state
in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a
statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial
limits of that state." However, the reach of the bankruptcy court's
subpoena power is more confined than that for ordinary federal
courts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 (e) 121
The uncertain question is when if ever the reach of the bank-
ruptcy court's original process is ever more extensive than the
federal rules indicate. On rare occasions the courts have implied a
greater reach of process to correspond with subject matter juris-
diction. Thus, the bankruptcy court can issue an injunction into
another state to protect property within its exclusive jurisdiction
which is located there. 122 And in the Eighth Circuit the bankruptcy
court which has property in its possession which is located in an-
other state may determine rights to that property by way of process
served on out-of-state claimants. 23 On the other hand, it has been
held that in a turnover proceeding the process must be served
within the territorial limits of the particular bankruptcy court. 2 4
The Proposed Bankruptcy Rules will dispel much of the un-
certainty, authorizing nationwide service of process from the bank-
ruptcy court. 25
120 Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935); 1 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY § 2.11(1) (14th ed. 1971).
121 This is because the Bankruptcy Act § 41a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 69a(4),
permits the subpoena of witnesses before the referee from no greater
a distance than 100 miles. See 1 CoLLIER ON BANKmupTCY § 2.11(2.1)
(14th ed. 1971).
122 Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610 (1934); cf., Acme Harvester Co. v.
Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300 (1911).
123 In re Granite City Bank of Dell Rapids, 137 F. 818 (8th Cir. 1905);
see also, In re Pure Rock Asphalt Co., 28 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
124 Noll v. Hodgson, 70 F.2d 19 (4th Cir. 1934).
125 Rule 704(f) (1). Some process can be served worldwide. Rule 704(f)
(2).
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V. RELIEF AVAILABLE: FORM OF ORDER
Questions sometimes are raised as to the kind of relief the
bankruptcy court is empowered to grant and the form of the order
it is empowered to make. Invariably, these questions have to do
with when the trustee is the prevailing party. Most likely under
section 2a(15) the bankruptcy court can grant whatever relief is
necessary since that provision says as much. The order entered could
be a turnover order, a decree cancelling transfers, liens, or the like, a
decree for the payment of money from specified funds or from
general funds, or a money judgment.126
The turnover order is the stock in trade of the bankruptcy court
and is deserving of further explanation. A turnover order is an
order of restitution seeking to get at the property or its identifiable
proceeds rather than at the third person. Even though summary
jurisdiction has been established, the trustee is not entitled to a
turnover order unless he has proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the property has been extracted from the estate and that
the third person has actual possession and can comply with the
turnover order. In Maggio v. Zeitz2 7 the Supreme Court emphasized
that a turnover order is inappropriate except where the third person
can comply with it. This is so because the turnover order commonly
is enforced through civil contempt proceedings which can result
in incarceration, and in those contempt proceedings a turnover order
is res judicata on the question of possession as of its date.
In proving the requisite possession the trustee may benefit from
a presumption of continued possession. It is noteworthy that the
turnover may be ordered on the strength of that presumption even
though contradicted by testimony where that testimony is not cred-
ible.128
It should also be noted that a turnover order may be the basis of
a nonbankruptcy court money judgment and in that suit would
have res judicata effect. 2 9
126 See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1947); May v. Henderson, 268
U.S. 111 (1925); In re J. S. Mobile Homes, 434 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir.
1970); South Falls Corp. v. Rochelle, 329 F.2d 611 (5th cir. 1964);
Governor Clinton Co. v. Knott, 120 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.), appeal
dismissed, 314 U.S. 701 (1941).
127 333 U.S. 56 (1947).
128 Sahn v. Pagano, 302 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 819 (1962).
129 Kane v. Smith, 56 Wash. 2d 799, 355 P.2d 827 (1960); Sampsell v.
Gittelman, 55 Cal. App. 2d 208, 130 P.2d 486 (1942).
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VI. FINAL REMARKS
The preceeding discussion identifies and simplifies the most
significant features of summary jurisdiction in straight bankruptcy.
The Proposed Bankruptcy Rules will clarify and resolve many of
the problems, however, difficulties will remain.
